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DOMESTIC POLICIES 
 
 
 
The article provides an analysis of po-
litical party system of the Republic of Es-
tonia in the mid-2010s. The analysis is 
based on the works of Moris Duverger. As 
one might expect, the establishment of pro-
portionate electoral system in Estonia has 
resulted in the formation of a multi-party 
system, in which no single party dominates 
in the Parliament even in a short run. The 
article demonstrates that though the Esto-
nian political party system develops in line 
with the tendencies typical of political party 
systems of most European countries, some 
of its elements are more common to post-
communist countries. It indicates that the 
political party system in Estonia has stabi-
lized throughout the past decade. Today, 
five sixths of voters support one of the four 
main political parties. A minority of voters 
does not consider any of the four dominant 
parties as a representative of their interests; 
thus, they vote for parties that were previously 
represented in the Parliament. This allowed 
the two minor political parties to pass into the 
Parliament at the 2015 elections: the Esto-
nian Conservative People’s Party, and Free 
Party. In the long run the minor parties will 
be able to keep parliamentary seats depen-
ding on their ability to build coalitions, either 
with the three governing parties — the Re-
form Party, the Pro Patria and Republic Union, 
and the Social-Democratic Party, or with 
opposition Centre Party. The article consid-
ers the impact of the split in the Estonian 
society between ethnic Estonians and Rus-
sophonic people on the political party sys-
tem. It demonstrates that the majority of 
Russophonic voters in Estonia support the 
Centre Party, every major political party in 
the country has its Russophonic voters, whi-
le Estonian United Left Party, which pro-
motes itself as a particular representative 
of the country’s Russophonic minority, re-
mains a marginal political force. 
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The parliamentary election held in the Republic of Estonia on March 1, 
2015, the course of the campaign, and the nature of coalition negotiations 
between the political parties following the announcement of election results 
make it possible to identify major trends in the development of the country’s 
political party system in the mid-2010s. The proportional election system 
established in the early 1990s, having undergone only slight changes, shaped 
the country’s multi-party system. Moreover, none of the parties has ever 
been dominant in the Parliament — the Riigikogu — even for a short time. 
The Reform Party, whose members (A. Ansip and Taavi Rõivas) have ser-
ved as Prime Ministers, remains ruling due to its ability to form coalitions 
with other political parties. This party, characterised as liberal, has been in 
coalition with the conservative Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, the left So-
cial Democratic Party, and even the Centre Party. 
On the one hand, the Centre Party is supported by a significant propor-
tion of Estonian Russian-speaking voters and thus is even more popular than 
the left Social Democratic Party. However, it does not show a similar ability 
to create coalitions with other parties. As a result, it has been in opposition 
for eight years. It is quite surprising, but the most stable ruling coalition in 
the history of the Estonian political party system has been the coalition for-
med by the liberal Reform Party, the conservative Pro Patria and Res Publica 
Union, and the left Social Democratic Party. However, the emergence of a 
stable four-party system, where the three above parties would form the rul-
ing coalition and the Centre Party remain in opposition, is obstructed by the 
fact that most voters do not consider any of these parties as representing their 
interests in the governmental bodies. As a result, new political parties are 
gaining popularity in a short-term perspective. 
In the 2015 parliamentary election, the new parties were represented by 
the Estonian Conservative People’s Party and the Free Party. In a short-term 
perspective, their popularity owes to the powerful anti-Russian rhetoric 
adopted by its leadership against the background of deteriorating Russia-EU 
relations in the aftermath of the 2014—2015 Ukraine crisis. In a long-term 
perspective, these parties will be able to remain in the Parliament only if 
they manage to create stable coalitions with larger political parties. Other-
wise, they will lose the 2019 election and become marginal. That is why the 
Estonian United Left Party positioning itself as a representative of Estonia’s 
Russian-speaking population, remains a marginal party that did not win any 
seats either in 2015 or in the previous election. Most of Estonia’s Russian-
speaking voters prefer the Centre Party, others vote for other Parliamentary 
parties, and, finally, a considerable proportion of the Russian minority does 
not participate in Parliamentary elections. 
 
Estonia’s political party system in the context  
of general European and post-Soviet trends 
 
Since the demise of the USSR, the interactions between the Estonian po-
litical party and election systems have been a proof of Maurice Duverger’s 
thesis that proportional representation creates conditions favourable to foster 
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multi-party development [1, p. 298]. The 1992 Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia establishes a parliamentary republic with a president elected by 
the Parliament (if the Parliament fails to elect a president, this authority is 
transferred to a special college comprising members of the Parliament and 
local municipalities). The Cabinet is formed by members of the Parliament 
according to the results of parliamentary election held in accordance with the 
proportional representation system. The prime minister has wider powers 
than the president in addressing the foreign and domestic policy issues. The 
proportional representation system also explains the large number of Parlia-
mentary parties. 
Political scientists outside Estonia pay little attention to the country’s po-
litical party system considering it in comparison with the political party sys-
tems of the other post-Soviet states. A good example is the monograph by 
the Ukrainian political scientist A. Mekleshevich dedicated to a comparative 
analysis of the political party systems of the three Baltic states — Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania — as well as Russia and Ukraine [2]. In Estonia, the 
most eminent researcher of the country’s political party system is the politi-
cal scientist R. Toomla, who published two monographs on the topic — one 
dedicated to the development of the Estonian political party system in the 
1920s-1930s and the 1990s [3] and the other — to its development in the 
first decade of the 21st century [4]. R. Toomla considers Estonia’s political 
party system over these periods in the context of general European traditions 
of political party system development — both those theoretically generalised 
in the above cited work of M. Duverger and the new trends identified only in 
the beginning of the 21st century. 
It also seems justified to analyse Estonia’s political party system in the 
context of trends characteristic of post-Soviet states. Firstly, one cannot but 
notice similarities between the political party systems of Estonia in Russia. 
Between the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2015 and the 
elections in Russia in 2011 and 2015, the parliaments of both countries (in 
the case of Russia, the lower chamber of the Parliament — the State Duma) 
consisted of four parties, with the first one ruling, the second — opposi-
tional, the third — nationalistic, and the fourth — social democratic. In both 
states, the ruling party relied on the support from either the nationalist or the 
social democratic party. Secondly, Russia still exhibits a binary attitude to 
Estonia and the other two Baltic states: sometimes they are considered as 
post-Soviet countries and sometimes as European. This explains the duality 
of Russia’s foreign policy towards these countries [5]. 
 
Estonia’s ruling coalition — a union of liberals, 
conservatives, and socialists 
 
The ideological designation of the political parties or, in other words, 
“the communicative strategy aimed to present its favourable image to the tar-
get audience while jamming the competitors using ideological terminology” 
[6, p. 68], does not always have anything to do with ideology. However, the 
three political parties comprising the Estonian Cabinet in 2007—2015 opt 
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for spatial positioning. The most popular party — the Reform Party — positions 
itself as a liberal one. The leaders of this party — A. Ansip in 2005—2014 and 
T. Rõivas in 2014—2015 — have served as prime ministers for over a decade. 
In the first half of the 2010s, the popularity of this party was decreasing as 
the population’s discontent with the government was growing on account of 
the global economic crisis. If, in the 2011 parliamentary election, the party 
won 33 seats in the Riigikogu — the unicameral Parliament of Estonia, in 
2014, it had only 30 seats. 
The popularity of the other two Cabinet parties was also declining. In 
2001, the conservative Pro Patria and Res Publica Union had 23 seats in the 
Riigikogu, after the 2015 election, it had only 14. The losses of the Social 
Democratic Party were less significant — 19 seats in 2001 against 15 in 
2015. Despite the ideological differences between the liberals, conservatives, 
and social democrats — who would create a two-party coalition against the 
third party in a three-party system — the parties managed to forge an alli-
ance within the ruling coalition. Following the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
all three parties — the liberal Reform Party, the conservative Pro Patria and Res 
Publica Union, and the Social Democratic Party joined the ruling coalition. 
This coalition, known as ‘A. Ansip’s second Cabinet’, stayed in power 
for four years between the 2007 and 2001 elections. This was the only case 
in Estonia since 1991, when the same ruling coalition stayed in power 
throughout the inter-election period. For instance, two cabinets worked be-
tween the 1992—1995, three in 1995—1999, two in 1999—2003, and two in 
2003—2007. Finally, according to the results of the 2011 parliamentary 
election, the cabinet was formed by a coalition between the Reform party, 
the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union. However, this government did not 
stay in office until 2015. In 2014, it was replaced by a Cabinet formed by a 
coalition between the Reform Party and the Social Democratic Party. As a 
result, a stable coalition of liberals, conservatives, and social democrats 
emerged in Estonia. Its stability owes to the confrontation between these 
three parties, on the one hand, and with the oppositional Centre Party, on the 
other — the four of them representing the Estonian elite. 
 
The Estonian Centre Party: eight years in opposition 
 
If the Reform Party has been the ruling party in Estonia for over a dec-
ade, the Centre party has been in opposition since the 2007 election. In 
2005—2007, the Reform Party and the Centre Party comprised the ruling 
collation knows as ‘A. Ansip’s first Cabinet’. The Centre Party’s leader 
E. Savisaar served as the Minister of Economy and Communications in this 
Cabinet. However, the 2007 election resulted in the formation of a three-
party ruling coalition discussed above and the Centre Party became opposi-
tion. E. Savisaar was elected mayor of Tallinn and retained this post for the 
next eight years. Although, socialist or social democratic parties usually po-
sition themselves as representatives of the poorest voters, in Estonia, this 
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niche is secured not by the Social Democratic Party, as one could expect, but 
rather by the Centre Party widely supported by both the Russian minority 
and ethnic Estonians. The Centre Party is more popular among the Russian 
minority than ethnic Estonians, because, on average, the financial situation 
of the Russian-speaking population is often more difficult than that of ethnic 
Estonians. 
The Centre party is one of the oldest in Estonia. It was established as 
early as 1991 as a successor to the Popular Front of Estonia. Another party 
with a long history is the Social Democratic Party (founded in 1990). After 
losing the 1995 parliamentary election and participating in a number of 
mergers, it was renamed the People's Party Moderates. Under the new name, 
it achieved success in the 2003 parliamentary election and regained its old 
name of the Socialist Democratic Party, under which it has been operating 
since. Finally, the third oldest party is the Pro Patria National Coalition (es-
tablished in 1992). In 1994, a number of activists left the party to found the 
current ruling Reform Party. After the 1995 parliamentary election, the Pro 
Patria National Coalition merged with the Estonian National Independence 
Party forming the Pro Patria Union. Finally, in 2006, the Pro Patria Union 
merged with the populist Res Publica Party founded prior to the 2003 elec-
tion and formed the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union. 
Unlike the other Estonian political parties, whose support base differs 
significantly from one election to another, the electorate of the Centre Party 
has been stable over almost two decades. In the 1999 parliamentary election, 
it won 28 seats, in 2003 28, in 2007 29, in 2011 26, in 2015 27. The ruling 
Reform Party’s criticism of the Centre Party rests on the alleged connection 
between the Centre Party’s leadership and the Russian elite. Whereas the 
role of Estonia and the other Baltics in Russia’s foreign policy has signifi-
cantly diminished since 1999 [7], in Estonian politics, the image of Russia is 
still of crucial importance. If the Russian-speaking voters take the alleged 
connection between the Centre Party and the Russian elite positively, such 
connections — as the ideologists of the Reform Party see it — should appal 
ethnic Estonians and compel them to vote for the other parties. In effect, this 
does not take place, and the Centre Party’s electorate remains stable. 
 
Far right parties in Estonia: a schism caused by the Ukraine crisis 
 
The 2014—2015 Ukraine events did not affect the voters of the Centre 
Party in the 2015 election. No surprise that, after the Crimean referendum on 
joining Russia, the Centre Party’s leader E. Savisaar adopted a neutral posi-
tion stating that what matters is not whether the referendum was legitimate 
but that the population of Crimea and the rest of Russia is content with its 
results [8]. Paradoxically, these events caused a greater damage to the na-
tionalistic Pro Patria and Res Publica Union. In the 2015 election, the party 
won 14 seats in the Parliament as opposed to 23 in 2011. The 2015 election 
was the worst for the party in more than a decade. It seems that the key cause 
of the Union’s failure was a schism between the Estonian far right politicians 
triggered by the Ukraine events. 
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The merger between the Pro Patria Union and the Res Publica Party in 
2006, on the one hand, made it possible for the untied party to become a mo-
re tangible force in Estonian politics, on the other, unsettled many veterans 
of the Pro Patria Union. As a result, foreseeing the failure of the Pro Patria 
and Res Publica Union in the 2015 parliamentary election, some veterans of 
the Pro Patria Union left the party and engaged in independent party activi-
ties. A. Herkel, the former leader of the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union in 
the Riigikogu, headed the Free Party, which brought together some of the 
veterans of the Pro Union party, who had left the Party after the merger with 
Res Publica. In the 2015 parliamentary election, this party won eight seats. 
However, the new party did not have any space for a political manoeuvre — 
it could enter the ruling coalition only with the Reform Party and the Pro 
Patria and the Res Publica Party. Prior to 2015, the party adopted a radical 
anti-Russian rhetoric; therefore, it can hardly form an alliance with the Cen-
tre Party. 
Of greater interest is another political party, which won seats in the 
Riigikogu in the 2015 parliamentary election, namely, the Conservative Peo-
ple’s Party of Estonia. On the one hand, this party is headed by M. Helme, 
Estonian ambassador to Russia in 1995—1999, who — alongside J. Madison — 
joined Estonian far right politicians after the diplomatic service [9]. M. Hel-
me has authored several books criticising Russia’s allegedly anti-Estonian 
policy [see, for instance, 10]. On the other hand, the party managed to win 
seven seats in the 2015 parliamentary election only due to its alliance with 
the Party of People’s Union representing the interests of Estonian farmers. In 
2007, the People’s Union was part of the ruling coalition alongside the Cen-
tre Party. Therefore, one cannot exclude an alliance between the Centre 
Party and the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, if the latter abandons 
its radical anti-Russian rhetoric as the basis of its election campaign. 
 
The ‘Russian’ parties of Estonia: a marginal position 
 
The political parties positioning themselves as representatives of Esto-
nia’s Russian minority lost seats in the Riigikogu in the first decade of the 
21st century. In 1994, the Russian Party in Estonia was established; it posi-
tioned itself as a successor to the Russian National Union of Estonia — a po-
litical party functioning in the country in the 1920s, which won a single seat 
in the 1920 parliamentary election. In the 1995 parliamentary election, this 
party created the Our Home is Estonia coalition with the United People’s 
Party. The coalition won six seats in the Riigikogu. In the 1999 parlia-
mentary election, the Russian Party in Estonia and the United People’s Party 
ran separately. As a result, the United People’s Party won six seats, whereas 
the Russian Party in Estonia did not pass the electoral threshold with 2 % of 
the vote. In the 2003 parliamentary election, neither the Russian Party in Es-
tonia, nor the United People’s Party obtained any seats in the Riigikogu. 
The failures of the ‘Russian’ parties in Estonia were believed to stem 
from two circumstances. Firstly, it is the adoption of the law on Estonian 
 Domestic Policies 
 56 
citizenship in the 1990s, which left many members of the Russian minority 
without the country’s citizenship and thus the right to vote. Secondly, it is 
the passivity of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. However, none 
of these factors is decisive. The events of 2007, when thousands of members 
of the Estonian Russian-speaking minority took it to the streets after the 
government had decided to relocate the memorial to Soviet soldiers from the 
centre of Tallinn to the military cemetery in the outskirts, refuted the thesis 
about the passivity of the Russian minority [11]. The proportion of the coun-
try’s permanent residents without the Estonian citizenship is also constantly 
decreasing, which means that many minority members undergo naturalisa-
tion thus gaining the right to vote. 
The electorate of the Centre Party, which was expected to grow as the 
Russian-speaking residents were acquiring citizenship, does not increase. 
One can suppose, that some of them vote for the ruling Estonian parties, for 
instance the Social Democratic party, with which the Russian Party in Esto-
nia merged in 2012. In the 2015 parliamentary election, 12 Russian-speaking 
Estonians representing almost all — both right and left — political parties 
won seats in the Parliament. It seems that some of them continue to vote for 
the United People’ Party, renamed the Constitution Party in 2006 (in 2008 it 
merged with the Estonian Left Party to form the Estonian Untied Left Party), 
however this proportion is rather insignificant. In the 2015 Parliamentary 
election, this party obtained fewer than 1,000 votes, i. e. a tenth of a per cent. 
Finally, one can suppose that a significant part of the Russian minority does 
not consider any of the current parties as representing their interests and does 
not take part in elections. 
 
*** 
The parliamentary election held in Estonia on March 1, 2015 demon-
strated the stability of the country’s political party system. Five out of every 
six voters opted for the same parties as four years ago. The discontent of a 
significant part of the population with the economic situation in the country 
resulted in the fact that the ruling Reform Party and the Social Democratic 
Party gained smaller representation in the Parliament, whereas the opposi-
tional Centre Party obtained a few seats more than earlier. The least success-
ful party was the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, which lost more than a 
third of its seats. 
At the same time, the Riigikogu seats were gained by the Conservative 
People’s party of Estonia and the Free Party, whose success rests on the anti-
Russian rhetoric of its leaders. It seems that these parties can secure their 
success if they manage to create a coalition with other parties; otherwise, 
they will not be able to past the electoral threshold in the parliamentary elec-
tion of 2019, whereas the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union will ‘regain’ 
some of the seats lost in 2015. The chances of the parties positioning them-
selves as representatives of the Russian minority — predominantly, the Es-
tonian United Left Party — seem slim in the situation when other parties, for 
instance the Centre Party, have found support among the Russian-speaking 
population. 
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